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ABSTRACT 
Attentional deployment is a primary strategy individuals employ to regulate 
emotion. Study 1 investigated whether visuo-spatial, goal-directed, attentional 
deployment to emotional faces serves as an effective mechanism for emotion 
regulation and whether individual differences in this ability predicts more effective 
emotion regulation. Participants given a goal to focus on positively valenced faces 
reported nearly three times less frustration in reaction to a stressful anagram task 
compared to those not given this goal. In addition, those with a greater ability to 
focus on happy faces and avoid angry faces persisted significantly longer on a 
stressful anagram task. In Study 2, a measure of an individual’s ability to deploy 
attention toward and away from emotional mental representations was developed. 
This measure of attentional control capacity for emotion (ACCE) adapted an 
explicit-cuing task switching paradigm where participants had to shift between 
emotional and neutral mental sets. Results showed that those higher in trait anxiety 
and worrisome thoughts took longer to switch from a neutral to an emotional mental 
set. In Study 3, participants were given a stressful anagram task and those who 
switched more efficiently from a neutral set to an emotional set were more 
frustrated by the stressful task. In addition, those who switched more efficiently 
from an emotional set to a neutral set persisted longer on the stressful task. These 
studies demonstrated that both visuo-spatial attentional deployment and attentional 
deployment to emotional mental representations are important to an individual’s 
ability to regulate emotion. 
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Attentional Deployment in Emotion Regulation 
 Often we encounter an anxiety-provoking or frustrating task that we must 
complete, whether it be speaking in public or simply clearing annoying spam from 
our email box. Yet most people are able to keep their emotions in check effectively 
enough to complete these tasks. Individuals have an extraordinary capacity to 
regulate emotion and employ numerous strategies that determine the magnitude of 
its impact. One of the primary strategies individuals employ to regulate emotion is 
attentional deployment (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005).  
 Attentional deployment is one of the first emotion regulation processes to 
appear in development and continues to be used in late adulthood (Mather et al., 
2004; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Rothbart & Sheese, 2007). Infants deploy their 
attention by shifting their gaze away from an emotion-eliciting stimulus to reduce 
their emotional reactivity (Rothbart & Sheese, 2007). According to socioemotional 
selectivity theory, older adults preferentially deploy their attention away from 
negative stimuli and toward positive stimuli as a goal-directed behavior to 
effectively regulate emotion (Carstensen, 1995; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005).   
 There is extensive evidence in the anxiety literature to suggest that 
dysregulation of attentional deployment processes is fundamental to the etiology 
and maintenance of clinical and nonclinical anxiety (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & IJzendoorn, 2007, and Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005, for reviews). The primary finding in this literature is that those high in anxiety 
selectively deploy attention toward threatening or negative stimuli. The most 
common paradigm used to assess this attentional bias toward threat is the dot-probe 
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paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In the picture version of this task, 
individuals are first presented two pictures simultaneously, where one is a negative 
picture and the other is emotionally-neutral. These pictures are then immediately 
replaced by a simple probe that appears behind just one of the pictures. The faster a 
participant responds to the probe following the negative picture, compared to the 
neutral picture, the stronger the attentional bias toward negative stimuli. This task 
relies on spatial orientation attentional processes through which the individual 
reveals their attentional deployment processes by orienting toward negative stimuli 
more than neutral or positive stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, 
& Dixon, 2004; Rohner, 2002). 
 However, studies of attentional biases tend to focus on automatic or 
preconscious attentional deployment rather than goal-directed attention. Bar-Haim 
et al. (2007) integrated a number of attentional bias theories and proposed that a 
guided threat evaluation system can override an automatic threat-evaluation and 
redirect attention to perform goal-directed behavior. This is compatible with 
emotion regulation theory that suggests goal-directed attentional deployment is a 
primary mechanism through which people regulate emotion (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). However, these hypotheses remain largely untested and have not been 
integrated.  
 Mogg et al. (2004) provided support for the hypothesis that some anxious 
individuals can override an automatic attentional threat-bias. They gave high trait-
anxious, low-trait anxious, and blood-fearful individuals a picture version of the 
dot-probe task. These pictures were presented for multiple durations to assess both 
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preconscious and conscious attentional processing. The results showed that both 
high-trait anxious and blood-fearful individuals had a bias toward threat at 
preconscious attentional processing. In contrast, given more time, at the conscious 
attentional processing, the threat-bias was no longer present for high anxious 
individuals and blood-fearful individuals reversed their bias and shifted it away 
from threat. This study highlights the importance of the time course in attentional 
processing and suggests that some individuals are able to override an attentional 
bias toward threat later in the time course of attention (also see Derryberry & Reed, 
2002; Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). 
Other evidence related to whether those high in anxiety can override an 
initial automatic bias toward threat is mixed. For example, MacLeod and Mathews 
(1988) showed that when state anxiety was high for all participants, high trait-
anxious participants demonstrated an attentional bias toward threat. In contrast, low 
trait-anxious participants demonstrated an attentional bias away from threat. The 
results of this study suggest some individuals are able to override a bias toward 
threat, and even direct attention away from threat when under stress. In contrast, 
Mogg, Mathews, Bird, and Macgregor-Morris (1990) had high and low trait-anxious 
participants perform a stressful anagram task and showed that all participants, 
irrespective of anxiety level, exhibited an attentional bias toward threat. This 
suggests that under stress people exhibit an attentional bias toward threat and do not 
override this bias. However, neither study investigated the time course of the 
attentional bias under stress. Therefore, it is unclear whether individuals exhibited 
an initial bias toward threat, and then later used controlled attention to avoid threat. 
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Although limited, there is also evidence that goal-directed attentional 
deployment serves as a generalized mechanism of emotion regulation. There is 
emerging evidence in the aging literature that suggests older adults preferentially 
deploy their attention toward positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli, 
whereas younger adults do not (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 
2005). In a recent study, both younger and older adults demonstrated an initial bias 
toward emotional pictures. In contrast, only older adults deployed their attention 
away from threat later in the time course of attention (Rosler et al., 2005). In another 
recent study, older and younger adults were given pictures of negative-neutral scene 
pairs (Knight et al., 2007). Older adults deployed their attention away from threat 
for longer durations than the younger adults. Socioemotional selectivity theory 
suggests the tendency for older adults to avoid threat and attend to positive stimuli is 
a goal-directed behavior that contributes to increased emotion regulation ability 
(Carstensen, 1995; Mather & Carstensen, 2005).  
 These findings from both the anxiety and aging literatures are consistent 
with the hypothesis that individuals use goal-directed attentional deployment to 
regulate emotion. However, none of these studies actually manipulated an emotional 
goal to preferentially deploy attention toward or away from emotional stimuli. Some 
recent studies have trained individuals to exhibit an attentional bias away from 
threat or toward positive stimuli. They have shown this to be an effective way to 
enhance emotion regulation effectiveness (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, 
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). However, an explicit 
emotional goal related to attentional deployment was not given. The previous 
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studies employed the dot-probe paradigm and modified the task so that the location 
of the probe was completely predictable. Specifically, the probe always followed 
either a neutral stimulus (as opposed to a threatening stimulus) or a positive 
stimulus (as opposed to a threatening stimulus) so that participants would learn to 
avoid threat and focus attention on either neutral stimuli or positive stimuli. 
Minimal demand was placed on goal-directed attention because no goal was given. 
To place a significant demand on goal-directed attention, an emotional goal should 
be given that instructs individuals to focus on a particular emotional category. In 
addition, the location of the probe should be unpredictable so that individuals must 
maintain the emotional goal throughout the entire task.  
In order to determine the effectiveness of goal-directed attentional 
deployment, the choice of criterion measures of emotion regulation is critical. 
Subjective measures of emotional reactivity most often serve as the criterion 
measures of effective emotion regulation. However, objective measures of behavior 
provide important convergent (or divergent) information regarding the effectiveness 
of emotion regulation. Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder (2007) observed that while 
examining inner cognitive and experiential processes are important in psychology, 
behavior should be just as important, and yet it is rarely measured. In addition, the 
experiential, physiological, and behavioral outcomes of emotion and emotion 
regulation are often loosely coupled and sometimes discrepant (Bradley & Lang, 
2000; Hubert & de Jong-Meyer, 1990; Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006; 
Mauss, Levensen, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Therefore, both self-report 
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and behavioral outcomes should be assessed to gain a more complete picture of 
emotion regulation effectiveness. 
 Studies of attentional control and anxiety, or emotion in general, tend to 
focus on visuo-spatial attention processes. In contrast, numerous theories of 
emotional dysregulation emphasize attentional control deficits for emotional 
imagery and thought content. There are numerous groups of individuals who exhibit 
a deficient ability to deploy attention away from emotional thought content and 
imagery including high trait-anxious individuals, neurotics, depressive ruminators, 
and clinical anxiety patients (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Robinson, 
Wilkowski, Kirkeby, & Meier, 2006; Sarason, 1986; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006; 
Watkins & Mason, 2002). Theories of nonclinical and clinical anxiety purport that 
intrusive worrisome thoughts are a primary source of anxiety (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Sarason, 1986; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006). Eysenck et al.’s 
(2007) attentional control theory of nonclinical anxiety purports that high anxious 
individuals suffer from a general attentional control deficit, especially in mental set-
shifting and inhibition. In contrast, Sibrava and Borkovec’s (2006) cognitive 
avoidance theory of clinical anxiety suggests that those high in anxiety avoid 
attention to emotional imagery, but this avoidance increases worrisome thoughts. 
Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) hypothesized that depressive ruminators exhibit 
an “attentional inflexibility,” that is, a deficient ability to shift attention away from 
negative ruminative thoughts. Recently, Whitmer and Banich (2007) directly linked 
multiple types of rumination to mental set-shifting ability and inhibition. Those who 
were more efficient at shifting between tasks or inhibiting previous mental sets 
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exhibited lower levels of rumination. In sum, these studies suggest that an 
individual’s ability to apply attentional control to emotional mental representations 
is critical to effective emotion regulation.  
While crucial to our understanding of emotional dysregulation, the literature 
lacks a measure of the ability to apply attentional control to emotional mental 
representations. As a result, one goal in these studies will be to develop such a 
measure and determine whether this ability predicts emotion regulation 
effectiveness. Individual differences in this ability will be measured by adapting a 
task switching paradigm and measuring the time it takes individuals to switch from 
an emotional mental set to a neutral mental set and from a neutral set to an 
emotional set (Johnson, in press a). This measure of emotional attention set-shifting 
assesses attentional control capacity for emotional representations (ACCE). The task 
measuring ACCE will capitalize on the theoretically rich area of task switching 
(Monsell, 2003). Generally, it takes more time to switch between tasks than to 
perform the same task repeatedly. The additional time required to switch between 
tasks has been termed switch cost. Switch cost is thought to reflect multiple 
executive processes required to reconfigure a task set and other attentional processes 
unrelated to task set reconfiguration (Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Accordingly, individual differences in 
emotional attention set-shifting will be measured by the magnitude of switch cost.  
Vogel and Awh (2008) noted that recently cognitive neuroscientists have 
begun to use individual differences in cognitive processes to constrain cognitive 
theory. This is an example of Cronbach’s (1957) call for the integration of 
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correlational and experimental psychology – a challenge often heralded but rarely 
employed. Studies of attentional deployment in emotion regulation theory offer an 
excellent opportunity to capitalize on individual differences. Therefore, the current 
studies will integrate experimental and individual-difference approaches to 
determine whether attentional deployment can serve as a mechanism of emotion 
regulation. 
This paper reports three studies including one study of the role of visuo-
spatial goal-directed attention in anxiety and emotion regulation and two studies that 
investigate the relationship between emotional attention set-shifting (measuring 
ACCE) and emotion regulation effectiveness. In Study 1, it is predicted that those 
given the emotional goal to deploy attention toward positive emotional stimuli 
under stress will exhibit less emotional reactivity to a subsequent stressor (e.g., 
report lower levels of frustration) and persist longer on a subsequent stressful task. 
In addition, individual differences in the ability to employ goal-directed attention to 
positive emotional stimuli under stress will also be predictive in that those with a 
greater ability to deploy attention will exhibit less emotional reactivity to a 
subsequent stressor and greater persistence on a subsequent stressful task. The 
literature is conflicted regarding the role of anxiety in one’s ability to employ goal-
directed attention. Anxiety’s role will be investigated by testing whether it 
moderates individuals’ ability to strategically deploy attention to positive emotional 
stimuli and away from negative emotional stimuli.  
 Study 2 examines whether ACCE is related to both trait anxiety and current 
levels of worrisome thoughts. Eysenck et al.’s (2007) attentional control theory 
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suggests those higher in anxiety should exhibit a deficit in switching ability, 
particularly in disengaging attention from emotional stimuli. As a result, those 
higher in anxiety should exhibit an increased emotional-to-neutral switch cost and a 
reduced neutral-to-emotional switch cost. In contrast, Sibrava and Borkovec’s 
(2006) cognitive avoidance theory predicts those higher in anxiety avoid attention to 
emotional imagery and therefore should exhibit an increased neutral-to-emotional 
switch cost and a reduced emotional-to-neutral switch cost. To distinguish ACCE 
from general attentional control capacity, working memory capacity (WMC) will 
also be measured. Individual differences in attentional control capacity have been 
captured well by WMC as measured by complex span (Unsworth, & Engle, 2007). 
Those higher in WMC demonstrate superior inhibition ability (Kane & Engle, 2003; 
Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001), switching ability (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & 
Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004), and updating ability (Oberauer, 
2005).  
Study 3 investigates the role of ACCE in general emotion regulation. The 
cognitive and social neuroscience literatures offer important insight into how 
emotional attention set-shifting may be related to emotion regulation. In one 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study, participants were given compound 
stimuli that consisted of faces on which a word was superimposed (Yeung, 
Nystrom, Aronson, & Cohen, 2006). They had to switch between judging the gender 
of the face and the number of syllables of the word on that face. Yeung et al. (2006) 
found that activity in the brain regions selective for the currently irrelevant task 
predicted the magnitude of the switch cost. For example, participants exhibited a 
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larger switch cost of switching from a gender-to-word judgment when their brain 
activity indicated they failed to disengage the gender mental set during the word 
judgment. Similarly, Winston, O’Doherty, and Dolan (2003) showed that brain 
regions that respond to emotional expressions (i.e., amygdala and fusiform gyrus) 
were active whether participants were making an emotionally-neutral judgment or 
an emotionally-directed judgment (see also Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002).  
These findings suggest two predictions for the relationship between 
emotional attention set-shifting and emotion regulation. First, individuals with less 
effective emotional attentional control may exhibit difficulty disengaging the 
emotional mental set and reconfiguring to the neutral set. This will result in a larger 
switch cost for the emotional-to-neutral task switch. Similarly, if those with less 
effective emotional attentional control have difficulty disengaging the emotional 
mental set, then switching from a neutral set back to an emotional set should be 
facilitated. This will be reflected in a reduced neutral-to-emotional mental set switch 
cost. Like Study 1 and Study 2,  emotion regulation effectiveness will be assessed 
using both self-report of emotional reactivity to a stressful task and by measuring 
persistence time on this task.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 109 (67 female) undergraduate psychology students who 
volunteered to participate as one alternative for supplemental course credit. All 
10 
Emotional Attention             
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. The average age was 19.03 
years (SD = 1.59). 
Materials 
Dot-probe task. To test whether an individual can use goal-directed attention 
on emotional stimuli, a modified dot-probe task was used (MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Tata, 1986). In this task, participants are visually presented a pair of faces, one 
above another, and these faces are then removed and a dot-probe appears in the 
previous location of just one of the faces. Participants respond as quickly as possible 
to the dot-probe by indicating whether one or two dots are presented. Stimuli were 
36 faces with the highest validity ratings from MacBrain Face Stimulus Set 
(Tottenham et al., 2002). Each face pair consisted of the same person, where one 
picture had a happy expression and the other picture had an angry expression. Only 
happy and angry faces of high intensity were used (Tottenham et al., 2002). To 
assess the point in the time course of attentional processing when participants are 
able to deploy goal-directed attention, the face pairs were presented for three 
durations, 17ms (including a neutral-pair mask for 68ms that immediately followed 
a happy-angry pair), 500ms, and 1250ms (Milders, Sahraie, & Logan, 2008; Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). The 17ms presentation period was used to assess 
preconscious attentional processing (Milders et al., 2008). The 500ms presentation 
period was used because it represents the most common presentation period and 
represents both preconscious and conscious attentional processing. The 1250ms 
presentation was used to provide ample time for controlled attention processes.  
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Stressful anagram task. The anagram task was designed to place a demand 
on emotion regulation (i.e., elicit anxiety and frustration) where participants had to 
unscramble a group of letters to make a single word (MacLeod et al., 2002). Four 
anagrams were presented. Two were insoluble anagrams, and two were difficult, 
multi-syllable anagrams. To increase the anxiety and frustration elicited by the task, 
participants were instructed not to write anything down during the task. To place an 
additional demand on emotion regulation, they were informed that at the end of the 
session they would be asked to recall what strategies they used to solve the 
anagrams without the ability to write anything down. The primary dependent 
variable was the duration of time participants persisted in trying to solve the 
anagrams.  
Questionnaires. Trait anxiety was measured using the Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Speilberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Feelings of state 
anxiety and state frustration were monitored repeatedly using a brief, two-item 
Likert scale (1-10) questionnaire.  
Procedure 
Participants first completed baseline measures of state anxiety and state 
frustration and the trait anxiety scale. Then, they were administered the first 
anagram task followed by a second assessment of state anxiety and frustration. This 
first administration of the anagram task ensured participants were under stress when 
taking the dot-probe task. Next, participants were randomly assigned to either a goal 
or no goal condition (N = 54 in the goal condition; N = 55 in the no goal condition). 
They were given either goal instructions that instruct participants to focus their eyes 
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on happy faces, and avoid focusing their eyes on angry faces, or the no goal 
instructions that only instructed the participants how to perform the dot-probe task. 
In addition, participants in the goal condition were told that whether the probe 
appeared behind a happy or angry face was completely random, so they should keep 
their eyes focused on the happy faces no matter where the probe may appear.  
The dot-probe task consisted of 16 practice trials followed by two blocks of 
72 test trials, each with 24 trials for each stimulus duration. The stimulus duration of 
17ms, 500ms, or 1250ms was randomized by participant. The location of the dot-
probe, that is, whether it appeared in the upper or lower location, or behind either 
face of a particular face-pair was randomized by participant with the constraints that 
the dot-probe had to appear an equal number of times behind happy and angry faces, 
and at the top and bottom of the screen. 
Following the dot-probe task, participants completed the measure of state 
anxiety and frustration a third time. Then, they completed a second administration 
of the anagram task. Four new anagrams were used for this second administration. 
To conclude the session, participants completed a fourth assessment of state anxiety 
and frustration.  
Results and Discussion 
Operationalization of Goal-Directed Attentional Bias 
 To operationalize whether individuals could employ goal-directed attention 
and deploy their attention toward happy faces, and away from angry faces, a bias 
index was created that was similar to what is used commonly in the attentional bias 
literature (e.g., Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). A difference score was created by taking 
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an individual’s mean reaction time to probes following happy faces and subtracting 
it from the mean reaction time to probes following angry faces. It will be called a 
Positive Bias Index, where positive scores indicate a bias toward happy faces, and 
negative scores indicate a bias toward angry faces. Prior to creating the Positive 
Bias Index, reaction times shorter than 150ms and longer than three standard 
deviations above an individual’s mean reaction time were excluded from all 
analyses.  
Effect of Emotional Goal on Attentional Bias  
Prior to testing differences between the conditions, individuals in the goal 
condition were tested to determine if they were able to focus their attention on 
happy faces and avoid angry faces. Differences between reaction times for probes 
following angry faces and probes following happy faces were tested by performing 
three repeated-measures ANOVAs at each stage of the time course. In the goal 
condition at the preconscious stage of the time course (i.e., at 17ms), individuals 
responded significantly faster to angry probes (M = 632.88, SD = 112.19) than to 
happy probes (M = 662.60, SD = 129.84), thereby indicating a bias toward angry 
faces, F(1, 53) = 4.20, p = .045. There was no significant bias at the midpoint in 
attentional processing. However late in the time course (i.e., at 1250ms), individuals 
were able to follow the emotional goal and responded significantly faster to probes 
following happy faces (M = 614.44, SD = 108.35) than to angry faces (M = 655.09, 
SD = 161.37), thereby exhibiting a bias toward happy faces, F(1, 53) = 4.41, p = 
.040. Thus, as Figure 1 demonstrates, those in the goal condition were able to 
override an automatic bias toward threat, and use goal-directed attention to deploy 
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their attention away from threat late in the time course. Trait anxiety did not 
moderate any of these differences.  
In contrast, in the no goal condition at the midpoint in the time course (i.e., 
500ms), individuals responded significantly faster to angry probes (M = 578.10, SD 
= 81.43) than to happy probes (M = 601.80, SD = 98.66), F(1, 54) = 4.16, p = .046 
(See Figure 1). There was not a significant attentional bias at the preconscious or 
late stage of the time course. Thus, those in the no goal condition did not 
strategically deploy attention toward happy faces, but instead exhibited a bias 
toward angry faces at the midpoint in attentional processing. It is unclear why those 
in the no goal condition did not exhibit an automatic bias toward angry faces at the 
preconscious stage of processing, like those in the goal condition. However, while 
trait anxiety did not moderate any of these differences, trait anxiety was moderately 
lower in the no goal condition, F(1, 106) = 3.03, p = .085). This trend could help 
account for a reduced (and somewhat reversed) bias toward angry faces early in 
attentional processing in the no goal condition. 
To test whether those in the goal condition followed the emotional goal and 
deployed attention to happy faces more than those in the no goal condition, the 
Positive Bias Index was compared across conditions at the 500ms and 1250ms time 
in processing, when goal-directed attention is possible. Two univariate analyses of 
variances (ANOVAs) were performed, where condition (goal vs. no goal) served as 
the independent variable, and a Positive Bias Index for each point in the time course 
served as each dependent variable. Figure 1 shows that those in the goal condition 
successfully deployed attention away from threat at the late stage of processing (i.e., 
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1250ms) significantly more than those in the no goal condition, F(1, 107) = 7.78, p 
= .006, η2 = .07. Trait anxiety did not moderate these differences.  
Mood Reactivity: Goal vs. No Goal Comparison 
 To test whether the first administration of the anagram task was stressful for 
individuals in both conditions, a repeated-measures ANOVA was run in each 
condition on frustration scores from before to after the first anagram task. 
Frustration increased significantly in the goal and no goal conditions, F(1, 53) = 
42.06, p <.0001, F(1, 52) = 49.42, p < .0001, respectively. Anxiety also increased 
significantly in the goal and no goal conditions, F(1, 53) = 10.00, p = .003, F(1, 52) 
= 10.34, p = .002, respectively.  
 To test whether goal-directed attentional deployment to happy faces led to a 
mood induction before the second anagram task, a one-way ANOVA was performed 
on both anxiety and frustration scores immediately after the dot-probe task. 
Deploying attention to happy faces did not have a direct effect on mood as no 
condition differences emerged, for frustration (p = .312) or anxiety (p = .447). 
To test whether goal-directed attentional deployment to happy faces 
predicted reactivity differences in frustration and anxiety in response to the second 
anagram task, two 2 X 2 mixed ANOVAs with a multivariate approach were 
performed, where condition served as the between-subjects factor and either 
frustration or anxiety before and after the second administration of the anagram task 
served as the within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between 
condition and frustration reactivity from before to after the second anagram task, 
F(1, 106) = 3.93, p = .049. Follow-up contrasts revealed that frustration scores in 
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the goal condition increased significantly less from before to after the second 
anagram task (before: M = 4.72, SD = 2.20, after: M = 5.87, SD = 2.53, F(1, 52) = 
10.23, p = .002, η2 = .16, compared to the increase in frustration scores in the no 
goal condition (before: M = 4.27, SD = 2.34, after: M = 6.38, SD = 2.42, F(1, 54) = 
42.43, p < .0001, η2 = .44. Trait anxiety did not moderate this difference. The effect 
size of the increase in frustration was almost three times larger in the no goal 
condition. Thus, those who were instructed to deploy attention toward happy faces 
and away from angry faces responded with significantly less frustration to the 
stressful anagram task. It is important to reiterate the dot-probe task itself did not 
induce a mood difference between the conditions. Consequently, the frustration 
reactivity difference between the conditions cannot be explained by a prior mood 
difference.  
Mood Reactivity: Individual Differences in Attentional Deployment 
For participants given the emotional goal, it is important to test whether 
individual differences in the ability to deploy attention toward happy faces and away 
from angry faces also predicted mood reactivity to the second anagram task. Those 
with a greater ability to focus on happy faces (i.e., a larger Positive Bias Index) did 
not report significantly less anxiety or frustration at any point in the time course of 
attentional processing. Trait anxiety did not moderate these relationships.  
It is possible that among participants in the no goal condition, there were 
individual differences in spontaneous generation of an emotional goal to deploy 
attention toward happy faces. Similar to the goal condition, individual difference in 
attentional bias toward happy faces did not predict anxiety or frustration at any point 
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in the time course of attentional processing. Trait anxiety did not moderate these 
relationships.  
Persistence on the Anagram Task: Goal vs. No Goal Comparison 
 To test whether those in the goal condition persisted significantly longer on 
the second anagram task, an ANOVA was performed where condition served as the 
independent variable and the time spent on the anagram task served as the 
dependent variable. Those in the goal condition did not persist significantly longer 
on the anagram task, p = .21.  
Persistence on the Anagram Task: Individual Differences in Attentional Deployment 
For those in the goal condition, individual differences in the ability to deploy 
attention toward happy faces and away from angry faces were investigated by 
testing the correlations between the Positive Bias Index and the time spent on the 
anagram task at the midpoint and late in the time course. Individuals with a greater 
ability to employ goal-directed attention toward happy faces persisted longer on the 
second anagram task for both the midpoint in attentional processing, r(53) = .29, p = 
.036, and late in attentional processing, r(53) = .32, p = .018. Figure 2 shows a 
positive relationship between an individual’s ability to deploy their attention to 
happy faces and anagram persistence. It is important to note that these relationships 
did not emerge between the Positive Bias Index and persistence on the first 
administration of the anagram task. Therefore, individual differences in the ability 
to deploy attention to happy faces under stress were related to reactivity to a 
subsequent stressor. In addition, trait anxiety did not moderate these relationships. 
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Again, it is possible that some participants in the no goal condition 
spontaneously generated an emotional goal and deployed attention toward happy 
faces. However, individual differences in attentional bias toward happy faces did 
not predict persistence on the second anagram task at any point in the time course of 
attentional processing. Trait anxiety did not moderate these relationships. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether goal-directed 
attentional deployment toward positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli 
could serve as a mechanism for emotion regulation. While long thought to be a 
major mechanism of emotion regulation, this study may be the first to directly link 
goal-directed attentional deployment to more effective emotion regulation. The 
results indicated that deploying attention toward positive faces and away from angry 
faces substantially lowered frustration reactivity to a stressful anagram task. In 
addition, individual differences in the ability to deploy goal-directed attention 
toward happy faces and away from angry faces predicted actual behavior during 
emotion regulation. Specifically, those who were better at deploying attention to 
happy faces persisted longer on the stressful anagram task.  
While this study demonstrates the importance of goal-directed visuo-spatial 
attentional deployment to emotion regulation, the purpose of studies two and three 
are to determine whether attentional deployment to internal emotional mental 
representations is also important to emotion regulation. These studies investigate the 
importance of internally focused attentional deployment to anxiety, worry, and 
emotion regulation in general. 
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighteen participants volunteered to participate in the study 
for course credit. All participants were undergraduate psychology students and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision (80 women; age, M = 19.21, SD = 2.32).  
Materials 
 Attentional Control Capacity for Emotion (ACCE) Task (Johnson, in press 
a). This task adapted the explicit task-cuing paradigm to measure an individual’s 
ability to shift attention between emotional and neutral mental sets. Participants 
performed one of two judgments on a compound stimulus that consisted of a face 
with a shape centered between the eyes. Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of 
the task and trial types. For the emotional judgment, participants were to identify the 
emotional expression on the face that could be happy, angry, or neutral. For the 
neutral judgment, participants were to identify the type of shape centered between 
the eyes on the face; which could be a circle, square, or triangle. Prior to seeing a 
face with a shape on it, the participant was shown either a solid bar or a patterned 
bar on the computer screen. A solid bar served as a cue to the participant to attend 
and respond to the emotional expression of the face (emotional mental set), whereas 
a patterned bar cued the participant to attend and respond to the type of shape 
between the eyes of the face (neutral mental set). Stimuli were two individuals from 
the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set, each with happy, angry, and neutral facial 
expressions (Tottenham et al., 2002) that were matched for valence and intensity.  
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 Moderators: General Attention Control Capacity, Trait Anxiety, and Worry. 
General attentional control capacity was assessed using a computerized version of 
the operation span task, called automated operation span (AOSPAN; Unsworth, 
Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). This task possesses good internal consistency (α = 
.78) and test-retest reliability (.83). In this task, participants are presented with a 
letter followed by a two-operation mathematical problem. The task varies the 
number of letters for memorization and subsequent recall of the letters must be in 
order. High span scores are achieved by holding a greater number of letters in 
memory, while maintaining a pre-specified math accuracy level (85% or higher). 
Each trial is paced so that a participant can only spend a fixed amount of time on a 
math problem. Each participant sets their own mathematical processing pace when 
performing the math task alone. The average time an individual spends on a math 
problem plus 2.5 standard deviations is set as the time limit for the math portion of 
the subsequent dual-task trials. For additional details regarding AOSPAN’s task 
structure, scoring, and validity see Unsworth et al. (2005).  
 Trait anxiety was measured using the Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et 
al., 1983). The degree to which an individual is experiencing worrisome thoughts 
was measured using the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Matthews et al., 1999).  
Procedure 
Participants completed the measures in following order: trait anxiety scale, 
worrisome thoughts scale, AOSPAN, and the ACCE task. For the ACCE task, there 
were 25 practice trials to learn the response mappings for the emotional judgment 
that required participants to press the 1, 2, and 3 keys for the happy, angry, and 
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neutral faces, respectively. Immediately prior to each face-shape combination, a 
solid bar was presented for either 200 ms or 1500 ms that served to cue the task set. 
Then, the face-shape combination stimulus was presented until the participant 
responded or until 5 s had elapsed. Feedback was provided after each response, so 
that “Correct!” or “Incorrect” was presented for 1500 ms after each response. If the 
participant did not respond within 5 s, “No response detected” was presented for 
1500 ms. Then, an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 500 ms elapsed until the next cue was 
presented and the cycle started again. The cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI) was 
randomized so that half the CSIs were short (200 ms) and half were long (1500 ms). 
The cue remained on screen throughout the CSI because maintaining the presence of 
the cue until a stimulus is presented places a greater demand on attentional control 
(Verbruggen, Leifooghe, Vandierendonck, & Demanet, 2007). Verbruggen et al. 
(2007) showed that maintaining the cue throughout the CSI reduces individuals’ 
self-initiation of a task switch during the CSI, thereby resulting in a greater demand 
on attentional control.  
There were also 25 practice trials where participants learned the response 
mappings for the shape judgment that required participants to press the 1, 2, and 3 
keys for the circle, square, and triangle, respectively. Each of these face-shape 
combinations was preceded by a patterned bar cue and otherwise was identical to 
the emotional judgment practice trials. For the final 25 practice trials, participants 
had to perform both emotional and shape judgments repeatedly and in alternation. 
Otherwise, these trials were the same as the previous practice trials.  
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Following the practice trials, test trials were given. To place a greater 
demand on attentional control, only 1/3 (or 40) of the total 120 test trials were 
switching trials, while the remaining were repetition trials (Dreisbach & Haider, 
2006; Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002). Dreisbach and colleagues showed that 
when repetition trials were more frequent, there was a greater switch cost compared 
to when repetition trials were less frequent than switching trials. This suggests a 
greater demand on attentional control in the frequent repetition trial condition 
(although see Dreisbach & Haider, 2006, for discussion of repetition benefit versus 
shift trial slowing). It follows that if emotion repetition trials are more frequent than 
switching trials, it would be more difficult to disengage from emotion and engage a 
neutral set and easier to disengage a neutral set and engage an emotional set, due to 
proactive interference for an emotional task set (Allport & Wylie, 2000). The 
frequent emotion repetition trial manipulation was used because the goal of this 
study was to investigate attentional control for emotional mental representations, 
and this maximized the attentional control demand for disengaging an emotional 
task set. Therefore, the breakdown of the test trials was as follows; 20 neutral-
emotion (NE) switching trials, 20 emotion-neutral (EN) switching trials, 60 
emotion-emotion (EE) repetition trials, and 20 neutral-neutral (NN) repetition trials. 
Except for the constraint that the first 10 test trials were emotion judgments, one 
pseudo-randomized order for the different trial types was created and presented to 
all participants.  
 In addition, given that the goal of this study is to investigate emotional 
attention set-shifting, the contribution of participants’ reaction to emotional faces 
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during switching was minimized. It is quite possible that the emotional valence of a 
stimulus also influences the ability to switch between mental sets (as shown in 
Yeung et al., 2006; Winston et al., 2003). Therefore, the valence of the face was 
always neutral for the trial preceding a switching trial and the switching trial. For 
example, if the participant is first cued to make an emotional judgment and then on 
the next trial is cued to make a neutral judgment, the faces on both these trials were 
neutral. This was the case for all types of switching trials. Therefore, any effects of 
an increased difficulty in disengaging from an angry face, for example, are 
minimized in all measures of switch cost. While this does not completely remove 
the effects of stimulus valence, this does minimize the effects. 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Prior to data analyses, data were screened for outliers by excluding reaction 
times (RTs) shorter than 130ms. In addition, excessively long RTs were screened by 
excluding RTs longer than 3 standard deviations above an individual’s mean RT. 
This resulted in trimming a small percentage of the data as less than 1% (0.3%) of 
the total RTs were excluded. In addition, participants were screened to ensure all 
were performing above chance levels of accuracy, and all met this criterion.  
Operationalization of Emotional Attention Set-Shifting Ability 
A method commonly used in the task switching literature was used to 
operationalize individual differences in set-shifting ability for emotional and neutral 
mental representations. Switch costs were calculated by computing two difference 
scores (e.g., Friedman et al., 2006; Monsell, 2003; Verbruggen et al., 2007). The 
mean RT for the NN repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for the EN 
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switching trials to obtain individual differences in EN Switch Cost. The mean RT 
for EE repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for NE switching trials to 
obtain individual difference in NE Switch Cost. These difference scores should not 
suffer from low reliability because the components of the difference score are not 
negatively correlated (Rogosa & Willett, 1983). The bottom portion of Figure 3 
shows how EN Switch Cost and NE Switch Cost were calculated for the ACCE 
task.  
 It is important to note that each of these switch costs do not represent a 
single cognitive process; rather they include all the executive processes required to 
disengage a previous mental set and engage a different mental set. For example, EN 
Switch Cost represents multiple processes required to disengage attention from the 
emotional mental set and engage attention on the neutral mental set. In addition, 
because the emotion repetition trials were more frequent, the attentional control 
demand was increased for an emotional to a neutral task switch, and decreased for a 
neutral to an emotional task switch (see Dreisbach & Haider, 2006). Therefore, EN 
Switch Cost reflects an increased attentional control demand, and NE Switch Cost 
reflects a decreased attentional control demand. The primary goal in this study was 
to capture individual differences in the ability to switch between emotional and 
neutral mental representations. Regardless of which precise component processes 
are involved, EN Switch Cost requires an individual to both disengage an emotional 
mental set and engage a neutral set and NE Switch Cost requires the individual to 
both disengage a neutral set and engage an emotional set; thereby capturing the 
construct of interest. In addition, by making emotion repetition trials more frequent, 
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the emotional set should be more difficult to disengage than the neutral set, thereby 
placing a greater demand on attentional control for disengaging emotional 
representations.  
Results and Discussion 
Emotional Attention Switch Cost 
The purpose of these analyses was to determine, 1) whether the ACCE task 
placed a significant demand on task switching process, and 2) whether frequent 
emotion repetition trials increased the cost of switching from an emotional set to a 
neutral set and decreased the cost of switching from a neutral set to an emotional 
set. 
A multivariate approach to a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on RT differences between EE, NN, NE, and EN trials revealed a 
significant main effect, F(3, 115) = 69.99, p < .0001. Bonferroni-adjusted contrasts 
revealed a significant NE Switch Cost, F(1, 117) =  33.43,  p < .0001, η2 = .222 and 
a significant EN Switch Cost, F(1,117) = 129.82, p < .0001, η2 = .526. As shown in 
Figure 4, these differences could not be explained by a speed-accuracy tradeoff 
because accuracy scores decreased when RTs slowed. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA revealed that switching from an emotional set to neutral set (M = 204.66, 
SD = 195.10) took significantly longer than switching from a neutral set to 
emotional set (M = 106.24, SD = 199.60), F(1, 117) = 13.41, p = .0004, η2 = .103. 
This provides evidence that disengaging an emotional set and engaging a neutral set 
placed a greater demand on attentional control than the reverse switch.  
Moderators: General Attentional Control Capacity, Trait Anxiety, Worry 
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To test whether general attentional control capacity moderates switch cost, 
two regressions were run where each type of switch cost (i.e., EN Switch Cost and 
NE Switch Cost) served as the predictor and AOSPAN served the criterion variable. 
This tests whether the magnitude of switch cost was moderated by AOSPAN. 
Neither switch cost was significantly moderated by AOSPAN (p = .216, p = .427). 
This indicates general attentional control capacity could not account for the cost of 
switching attention between emotional and neutral mental sets.  
Table 1 summarizes four regressions that test whether trait anxiety or worry 
moderates either EN Switch Cost or NE Switch Cost, where each type of switch 
cost served as a predictor variable and trait anxiety or worry served as the criterion 
variables. Both trait anxiety and worry significantly moderated NE Switch Cost so 
that those higher in trait anxiety and worry had a decreased ability to switch from a 
neutral mental set to an emotional mental set. However, the Fisher’s z-
transformation was used on all standardized beta coefficients from all the 
regressions. Bonferroni-corrected pair-wise comparisons were performed and none 
of the coefficients significantly differed. This suggests that while trait anxiety and 
worry appear to moderate emotional attention switch costs, the effect is modest and 
non-specific.  
 The ACCE task measured for the first time, to this author’s knowledge, 
individual differences in emotional attention set-shifting ability. Those higher in 
trait anxiety and worrisome thoughts exhibited increased difficulty in switching 
from a neutral mental set to an emotional mental set. Importantly, the switch costs 
could not be explained by general attentional control capacity. This is important 
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because it supports the idea that the switch costs measured by the ACCE task 
captured an attentional control capacity for emotional material specifically.  
 While this experiment demonstrated that performance on the ACCE task was 
related to trait anxiety and worry, it remains unclear whether ACCE performance is 
related to a generalized mechanism of emotion regulation. Therefore, it is important 
to test whether emotional attention set-shifting predicts emotion regulation 
effectiveness more directly.  
Study 3 
Method 
Participants  
Forty-two (30 women) undergraduate psychology students, who had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision, volunteered to participate in the study for course 
credit.  
Materials 
 The ACCE task was identical to that used in Experiment 1, except that the 
order of the practice trials (i.e., emotional vs. neutral mental sets) was 
counterbalanced. Trait anxiety was measured using the Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger et al., 1983). To assess a participants’ current feelings of anxiety and 
frustration at multiple times throughout the experiment, they were given a brief two-
item Likert scale (1-10) questionnaire. This questionnaire asked participants to rate 
their anxiety from 1 (not anxious) to 10 (extremely anxious) and frustration from 1 
(not frustrated) to 10 (extremely frustrated). Because participants answer these same 
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items multiple times, this brief questionnaire was given in place of a full scale of 
state feelings to minimize questionnaire reactivity. 
Stressful Anagram Task. The task designed to place a demand on emotion 
regulation (i.e., elicit frustration and anxiety) was an anagram task where 
participants had to unscramble a group of letters to make a single word (MacLeod et 
al., 2002). Four anagrams were given and consisted of two insoluble anagrams, and 
two difficult, multi-syllable anagrams. To increase the anxiety and frustration 
elicited by the task, participants were instructed not to write anything down during 
the task and were informed they would be asked to recall what strategies they used 
to solve the anagrams at the end of the session. The primary dependent variable was 
the total time participants persisted on the anagrams. Those who are better at 
regulating their emotion should be able to keep from being overwhelmed by 
frustration and anxiety and persist longer on the anagram task.  
Procedure 
 Participants completed the measures in the following order: trait anxiety 
questionnaire, baseline measure of state anxiety and frustration, ACCE task, second 
measure of state anxiety and frustration, anagram task, and third measure of state 
anxiety and frustration.  
Results and Discussion 
 Emotional Attention Switch Cost 
The effects related to ACCE and switch costs from Experiment 1 were 
replicated. A multivariate approach to a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on RT differences between EE, NN, NE, and EN trials revealed a 
29 
Emotional Attention             
significant main effect, F(3, 39) = 29.49, p < .0001. Bonferroni-adjusted contrasts 
revealed a significant NE Switch Cost, F(1, 41) =  11.25,  p = .002, η2 = .215 and a 
significant EN Switch Cost, F(1, 41) = 54.97, p < .0001, η2 = .573. These 
differences could not be explained by a speed-accuracy tradeoff because accuracy 
scores decreased when RTs slowed. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that 
switching from an emotional set to neutral set (M = 250.30, SD = 218.78) took 
significantly longer than switching from a neutral set to emotional set (M = 106.56, 
SD = 205.91), F(1, 41) = 8.60, p = .006, η2 = .173.  
Emotional Attention Switch Cost and Emotion Regulation 
 To test whether the anagram task induced anxiety and frustration, repeated-
measures ANOVAs were run on the short test of anxiety and frustration presented 
just before and after the anagram task. Both anxiety and frustration increased 
significantly, F(1, 41) = 19.57, p <.0001, η2 = .323; F(1, 41) = 27.60, p < .0001, η2 = 
.402, respectively.  
 Four regressions were performed to test whether the ability to switch 
between mental sets uniquely predicted self-reported anxiety and frustration in 
response to the anagram task above and beyond trait anxiety. Neither switch cost 
predicted state anxiety. However, Table 2 shows that those who took longer to 
disengage a neutral set and re-engage an emotional set were less frustrated in 
response to the anagram task. This suggests that those who were able to shift from a 
neutral to emotional mental set more quickly were more frustrated. Fisher’s z-
transformation was used on all standardized beta coefficients from the regressions. 
A pair-wise comparison was performed and the NE Switch Cost coefficient 
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predicted frustration significantly better compared to EN Switch Cost (z = 1.91, p < 
.05). This supports the idea that those who respond to a stressor with greater levels 
of frustration may not completely disengage an emotional mental set, thereby 
making it easier to shift to it from a neutral mental set (Winston et al., 2003; Yeung 
et al., 2006).  
 To test whether the ability to switch between emotional and neutral mental 
sets uniquely predicted persistence on the anagram task above and beyond trait 
anxiety, two regressions were performed where trait anxiety, and each type of 
switch cost served as predictors and the time spent on the anagram task served as 
the criterion variable. Table 3 shows that those with a reduced EN Switch Cost 
persisted significantly longer on the anagram task. Fisher’s z-transformation was 
used on all standardized beta coefficients from the regressions. A pair-wise 
comparison was performed and revealed no significant difference between the 
coefficients for each type of switch cost. Figure 5 presents a scatterplot 
demonstrating that those who more efficiently disengaged an emotional set and 
reconfigured to a neutral set persisted longer on the anagram task.  
General Discussion 
 Attentional deployment toward and away from emotional material is 
considered fundamental to emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007). While 
long thought to be a major mechanism of emotion regulation, Study 1 may be the 
first to directly link goal-directed attentional deployment to more effective emotion 
regulation. The results indicated that deploying visuo-spatial attention toward 
positive faces and away from angry faces substantially lowered frustration reactivity 
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to a stressful anagram task. In addition, individual differences in the ability to 
deploy goal-directed attention toward happy faces and away from angry faces 
predicted actual behavior during emotion regulation. Specifically, those who were 
better at deploying attention to happy faces persisted longer on the stressful anagram 
task.  
 Study 1 used goal-directed attentional deployment as a bridge between 
anxiety-related attentional bias theory and emotion regulation theory. Regarding the 
attentional bias literature, the results of this study support Bar-Haim et al.’s (2007) 
hypothesis that an automatic threat-evaluation can be overridden. These results also 
support the shifted attentional account of anxiety-related attentional biases 
(Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). This account suggests that 
both high and low anxious individuals will have a bias toward highly threatening 
stimuli, and individual differences arise in the intensity of stimuli at which threat is 
perceived. All faces in this study were highly threatening or highly positive and 
therefore individual differences in anxiety may not strongly predict attentional 
processing. Importantly, these findings extend this literature by showing that 
deploying attention to emotional stimuli can be used as generalized mechanism for 
emotion regulation, irrespective of dispositional levels of anxiety. This 
simultaneously supports emotion regulation theory that suggests attentional 
deployment is a major mechanism of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 
2007).  
 These results also extend the literature on age differences in emotion 
regulation. While older adults appear to self-initiate an emotional regulation goal to 
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deploy attention to positive stimuli, the results of this study indicate that younger 
adults can accomplish the same emotional goal and effectively regulate emotion as a 
consequence. Many of the previous studies investigate goal-directed emotional 
attention when little demand is placed on emotion regulation processes (Knight et 
al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005). It is possible that emotional regulation goals 
change in accordance with emotion regulation demands. This study showed that 
individuals are able to follow an emotional regulation goal while under stress and 
that this goal leads to increased regulation effectiveness on a subsequent stressor. 
Future studies should further investigate how different emotion regulation demands 
affect goal-directed emotional attention.  
 It is important to note that, overall, those in the goal condition who were told 
to deploy attention toward happy faces and away from angry faces did not persist 
significantly longer on the stressful anagram task. This prevents a causal 
interpretation of how persistence is affected by goal-directed attentional 
deployment. However, individual differences in the ability to deploy attention to 
happy faces did predict persistence on the anagram task, where those with a greater 
ability to deploy attention to happy faces persisted significantly longer. This 
provides initial evidence that individual differences in the ability to deploy attention 
predicts persistence on a stressful task. In addition, these findings provide evidence 
of convergence between experiential and behavioral domains when individuals are 
regulating emotion (Mauss et al., 2005).  
Future studies should elucidate the mechanisms through which attentional 
deployment to positive stimuli leads to more effective emotion regulation. The 
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findings in this study indicated that a general mood-induction from focusing 
attention on positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli could not account for 
the frustration reactivity differences between the conditions. An alternative 
explanation is that the positive attentional deployment goal carried over from the 
dot-probe task to the subsequent anagram task. Individuals in the goal condition 
may have consciously or unconsciously deployed their attention internally toward 
more positive thoughts, rather than being consumed by worrisome and frustrating 
thoughts. This may have led to decreased feelings of frustration after the subsequent 
anagram task. This explanation is consistent with the finding that goal-directed 
attentional deployment did not predict reactivity or persistence on the first anagram 
task prior to being given the emotional goal. This is also consistent with the aging 
literature that suggests young adults do not self-initiate goal-directed attentional 
deployment.  
Another mechanism by which attentional deployment to positive stimuli 
leads to more effective emotion regulation could be related to affective priming. It is 
possible that focusing on happy faces primed other concepts related to positive 
mood through spreading activation (Klauer & Musch, 2003; Neely, 1991). While 
this spreading activation did not induce a positive mood, it may have made positive 
thoughts and memories more readily accessible (Forgas, 2001). Additionally, 
making positive concepts and thoughts more accessible could also make other 
emotion regulation strategies more accessible, such as cognitive reappraisal (Gross 
& Thompson, 2007). Consequently, those individuals focusing on happy faces 
experienced less frustration and persisted longer on a stressful task. While the 
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results of this study do not fully elucidate the mechanisms of how attentional 
deployment leads to more effective emotion regulation, the findings do provide an 
important direct link between positive attentional deployment and effective emotion 
regulation.  
The results showed that those given a goal to focus on happy faces exhibited 
an initial preconscious bias toward angry faces while those without this goal did not. 
This pattern of results may be due to an opponent process effect of a goal. This type 
of effect was observed by Richeson and Trawalter (2008) who gave individuals the 
dot-probe task that consisted of Black-White face pairs. Then, they gave some 
individuals the goal to avoid appearing prejudiced (i.e., look at the Black faces to 
avoid appearing prejudiced). These individuals demonstrated an early attentional 
bias that represented a reversal of their goal in that they avoided attention to Black 
faces. In contrast, individuals without this goal did not exhibit an early attentional 
bias. Late in the attentional time course, individuals in the goal condition met their 
goal and exhibited attentional bias toward Black faces. This opponent process effect 
was demonstrated in the current results in that those in the goal condition exhibited 
a goal reversal. Early in the attentional time course they focused on angry faces, 
whereas later in the time course they met their goal and focused on happy faces. 
Those in the no goal condition did not exhibit this reversal. This discrepancy 
between preconscious and conscious attentional biases could have important 
implications for the training of positive attentional biases (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 
2008). By giving an individual a goal to avoid negative stimuli and focus on 
positive stimuli, we may paradoxically foster a preconscious threat-bias. Future 
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studies should determine the role and the longevity of this paradoxical effect in 
training positive attentional biases.      
By combining experimental and correlational approaches, Study 1 revealed 
findings that neither approach alone could uncover. The experimental approach 
showed that goal-directed attentional deployment to positive stimuli can serve as a 
generalized mechanism of emotion regulation. This causal link could not be 
established by using the correlational approach. However, the correlational 
approach showed that individual differences exist in the ability to use goal-directed 
attentional deployment under stress. Importantly, this approach showed that those 
better at using goal-directed attentional deployment under stress were also more 
effective emotion regulators. The experimental approach would have missed this 
informative finding because the approach would treat individual differences in goal-
directed attentional deployment as error variance. These two findings demonstrate 
the explanatory power gained by combining the experimental and correlational 
approaches (Cronbach, 1957; Vogel & Awh, 2008).  
Although speculative, these results suggest that training goal-directed 
attentional deployment could serve as a novel emotion regulation training technique 
for both nonclinical and clinical populations. MacLeod et al. (2002) trained 
nonclinical participants to attend to neutral words and avoid threatening words and 
found it predicted decreased anxiety vulnerability to a stressful task. This training 
appears to generalize to clinically anxious patients as well (Vasey, Hazen, & 
Schmidt, 2002). The results of this study indicated that frustration reactivity to a 
stressful task was decreased almost by a factor of three by simply attending to happy 
36 
Emotional Attention             
faces and avoiding angry faces. This represents a much larger impact of training 
than observed in the previous studies. This may indicate that encouraging 
individuals to rely on strategic attentional processes may be a more effective way to 
train better emotion regulation than relying on automatically trained attentional 
biases. Goal-directed attentional deployment holds considerable promise for future 
research into training more effective emotion regulation techniques. 
Studies 2 and 3 investigated the relatively unknown processes through which 
emotion is regulated by attentional deployment toward and away from emotional 
mental representations and thought content. To examine these processes, a new 
measure was developed to assess one’s ability to deploy attention to emotional 
mental representations, called attentional control capacity for emotion (ACCE). The 
ACCE task adapted a task switching paradigm and required participants to switch 
between emotional and neutral mental sets. Individual differences in ACCE were 
measured by the magnitude of switch cost from this emotional attention set-shifting 
task. This measure represents a significant shift in thinking about switch cost in that 
it is considered not only an executive control process, but also an important 
individual-difference construct in the context of emotion regulation.  
 In Study 2, individuals high in trait anxiety and worrisome thoughts 
exhibited a difficulty in switching from a neutral to an emotional set. The 
relationship between ACCE and trait anxiety/worry partially supported Sibrava and 
Borkovec’s (2006) cognitive avoidance theory of anxiety. Sibrava and Borkovec’s 
theory posits a primary source of anxiety is the constant avoidance of threatening 
imagery. The results showed that those high in anxiety and worry had a deficit in 
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ability to switch from a neutral to emotional mental set. This finding is consistent 
with cognitive avoidance theory because it should take longer for high anxiety 
individuals to switch to emotional set if they are attempting to avoid attention to 
emotional mental representations. However, this particular switch cost could not be 
statistically differentiated from the other types of switch costs in its relationship to 
anxiety. Therefore, this explanation should be interpreted cautiously. In addition, the 
ACCE task did not require participants to disengage attention from threat 
specifically, but rather from an emotional mental set that was not valence-specific. 
Therefore, the current study cannot test Sibrava and Borkovec’s theory directly. 
However, the ACCE framework provides a promising ground for future work 
testing a primary hypothesis in Sibrava and Borkovec’s theory that worriers 
specifically avoid threatening mental imagery. In addition, these results provide 
partial support of Eysenck et al.’s (2007) hypothesis that those high in anxiety 
exhibit a generalized switching deficit because the switch costs were not 
significantly different regarding their relationship to trait anxiety.  
 The findings connecting ACCE and anxiety highlight a new direction for 
future research on anxiety. Many theories of anxiety purport that those high in 
anxiety have selective difficultly disengaging attention from threatening material 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eysenck et al., 2007; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). Future studies should test emotional attention set-
shifting for threatening material specifically in high anxious individuals. While 
many studies have confirmed that those high in anxiety have difficultly disengaging 
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visual attention from threatening stimuli, the same hypothesis regarding disengaging 
attention from a threatening mental set has yet to be tested.  
The ACCE task appeared to capture a task switching ability for emotional 
representations specifically, as opposed to a general switching ability. General 
attentional control capacity, as measured by working memory capacity, did not 
moderate the cost of switching between emotional and neutral mental sets. The 
primary goal in this study was to test whether general attentional control capacity 
could account for switch cost in the ACCE task. However, this design does not rule 
out general switching ability as an explanation of switch cost in ACCE. To further 
establish the discriminant validity of the ACCE task, it should be compared to an 
identical switching task without the emotional relevance. Indeed, Johnson (in press 
a) designed such a task and has shown ACCE predicts emotion regulation better 
than general switching ability.  
Study 3 supported the importance of attentional deployment in successful 
regulation of emotion (Gross & Thompson, 2007). This study demonstrated a 
convergence between experiential and behavior domains of emotion regulation. 
Those higher in ACCE were less frustrated and persisted longer on the anagram task 
(Mauss et al., 2006; Mauss et al., 2005). In the behavior domain, those that were 
more efficient at disengaging attention from an emotional set persisted significantly 
longer on the anagram task. In the experiential domain, those with higher frustration 
reactivity switched more efficiently from a neutral to emotional set. In contrast, in 
Study 2, those higher in trait anxiety exhibited the opposite trend. This discrepancy 
suggests that the strategy to avoid emotional stimuli could be specific to high 
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anxiety individuals and is not an effective generalized emotion regulation strategy 
(Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006). Instead, it is more effective to be flexible in goal 
engagement, rather than maintain an avoidance goal like those high in anxiety. The 
relationship between ACCE and frustration reactivity suggests it is more effective to 
completely disengage an emotional set when this is the goal and re-engage emotion 
when it is the goal.  
 The emotional attention set-shifting task was designed to provide both a 
window into a mechanism of emotion regulation (i.e., attentional deployment) and a 
measure of individual differences in ACCE. Indeed, individual differences in ACCE 
were related to trait anxiety, worrisome thoughts, and general emotion regulation 
effectiveness. However, it is important for future research to determine whether 
ACCE can be manipulated to affect emotion regulation so that its causal status can 
be ascertained. For example, it is possible that if participants were put into an 
anxiety-provoking situation, anxiety and frustration could directly impact ACCE 
performance.  
 Future studies could investigate the executive processes necessary to 
successfully complete an emotional task switch including exogenous and 
endogenous processes. For example, task set reconfiguration is considered an 
endogenous attentional process, while the effect of proactive interference on switch 
cost is an exogenous process. Therefore, it is likely that switching between 
emotional and neutral mental sets required both endogenous and exogenous 
attentional processes (Johnson, in press a; Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Rubinstein et al., 2001). Future studies could determine the degree to which 
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emotional attention set-shifting is driven by exogenous processes and endogenous 
processes, just as general task switching theorists have investigated for many years 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Verbruggen et al. 2007).  
 This study highlights new questions about emotion regulation. How might 
internally-focused and externally-focused forms of attentional control for emotional 
mental representations interact to affect emotion regulation?  How do individuals 
consciously deploy attention externally to stimuli in the environment and internally 
to thoughts and imagery? It is possible that those who are less able to disengage 
their attention from emotional thoughts instead rely on deploying visual attention 
toward positive features of the environment, like a positive scene or happy face? 
The ACCE task may provide a framework with which to investigate this question 
because the task switching paradigm offers numerous ways to manipulate the 
demand on external and internal processes.  
In conclusion, these studies demonstrated that both visuo-spatial attentional 
deployment and attentional deployment to emotional mental representations are 
important to an individual’s ability to regulate emotion. Given the importance of 
attentional deployment in nonclinical anxiety, clinical anxiety, rumination, and 
depression, it is important to elucidate these attentional deployment mechanisms. A 
better understanding of these mechanisms will allow clinicians to target the 
cognitive processes responsible for ineffective emotion regulation and 
psychopathology. Determining the role of all forms of goal-directed attentional 
deployment provides an important avenue for discovering novel intervention and 
therapeutic techniques for those in need.  
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Table 1. 
Four Regressions With EN Switch Cost and NE Switch Cost as Predictors of Trait 
Anxiety and Worry.  
 
Reg. Number Predictor Variable Criterion Variable       b      SE b      β   
1  EN Switch Cost Trait Anxiety     .002       .003    .06  
2  NE Switch Cost Trait Anxiety    .010       .003   .24** 
3  EN Switch Cost Worry     .007       .004   .14 
4  NE Switch Cost Worry     .009       .004    .18*  
 
Note. For criterion variable worry, N = 118. For criterion variable trait anxiety data 
from experiments 1 and 2 were combined for an N = 160. Reg. = Regression. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 2. 
Regressions With Trait Anxiety, EN Switch Cost, and NE Switch Cost as Predictors 
of Frustration.  
 
Reg. Number Variable  b      SE b β   
1  Trait Anxiety  .056       .046 .19  
  EN Switch Cost .001       .002 .09  
2  Trait Anxiety  .042       .044 .14 
  NE Switch Cost         -.004       .001         -.33*  
 
Note. N = 42, *p < .05, **p < .01. Reg. = Regression. 
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Table 3. 
Regressions With Trait Anxiety, EN Switch Cost, and NE Switch Cost as Predictors 
of Anagram Persistence Time.  
 
Reg. Number Variable  b      SE b β   
1  Trait Anxiety  1293       1174 .17  
  EN Switch Cost -108           38         -.41**  
2  Trait Anxiety  1224       1187 .16 
  NE Switch Cost            -34           44         -.12  
 
Note. N = 42, *p < .05, **p < .01. Reg. = Regression. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Results show attentional biases toward either happy or angry faces as a 
function of the condition and time course in attentional processing. Positive scores 
indicate an attentional bias toward happy faces, whereas negative scores indicate an 
attentional bias toward angry faces. Early = 17ms faces presentation, Middle = 
500ms faces presentation, Late = 1250ms faces presentations. 
Figure 2. Results show anagram persistence time as a function of individual 
differences in the Positive Bias Index late in the time course of attention processing, 
when the faces were presented for 1250ms.  
Figure 3. A schematic of the ACCE task. Each trial began with a cue that informed 
the participant which judgment to make, the cue remained on the screen for either 
200ms or 1500ms until it was replaced by the stimulus on which the participant was 
to make a judgment. Then, a blank screen was presented for an iti (inter-trial 
interval) of 500ms and the next trial begins. The bottom section of the depiction for 
each task shows how each type of switch cost was calculated. RT = Reaction Time. 
See text for details.  
Figure 4. Results from Study 2 that show significant switch costs for both NE and 
EN trials and shows a significantly greater switch cost for EN trials, compared to 
NE trials. NN = neutral-neutral repetitions, EE = emotion-emotion repetitions, NE = 
neutral-emotion switches, EN = emotion-neutral switches.  
Figure 5. Results from Study 3 that show anagram persistence time as a function of 
EN Switch Cost. 
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